20121214_mjr_su5_021

This week began on a low point with the Phoenix Suns losing their 7th game in a row against the Orlando Magic. But just when things were looking their bleakest, the Suns turned it all around with their most impressive win of the season agianst one of the top teams in the conference on Wednesday, the Memphis Grizzlies.

The Suns were able to win that game by relying more on the defensive side of the ball than we've seen in the past...Holding the Grizzlies to just 80 points and tying their lowest points scored so far this season. Surely this was a fluke, right? Well if it was, the Suns fluked twice as they back-doored that performance with another impressive defensive victory against the Jazz whom they beat by 15 points and held to just 84 points...tying their 2nd lowest points scored so far this season as well.

So who do we have to thank for this remarkable turnaround?

1. Jared Dudley

Weekly Average: 17 points, 5 assists, and 5 rebounds in 41 minutes of play; +14

Since being moved to the starting small forward position, Jared Dudley has re-emerged as the "Junk Yard Dog" that earned him a reputation as one of the scrappiest players in the league, and made him a fan favorite. Dudley carried the weight of the team on his shoulders this week with his inspired play and energy on both ends of the court, JD was the biggest difference maker for the Suns in the last two wins, hands down.

2. Goran Dragic

Weekly Average: 14.5 points, 6.5 assists, 3.5 rebounds, 1.5 steals in 34 minutes of play; +10

Dragic didn't play against the Magic last Sunday due to an illness he had been fighting for several days prior. Many had questioned what was wrong with Goran who simply wasn't playing like himself. Well, at least we know there was a reason. Once Dragic came back healthy he showed the same aggressive, fast-paced play that he had displayed in the beginning of the season, and helped lead the Suns team to both of their victories this week.

3. Marcin Gortat

Weekly Average: 11 points, 9 rebounds, 2 assists, and 1 blocks in 33 minutes of play; +5

Gortat had been in a slump over the past few weeks. While we still aren't quite sure what the cause of it was, it appears that the Polish Machine picked himself up by the boot straps and got back to work this week...Getting a little better with each game. Marcin seems to be the type of player who is easily affected by the circumstances surrounding him, and a couple of bad plays can easily snowball into a couple of bad games. But Gortat got back to form this week when the Suns needed him most, playing excellent defense and securing rebounds to help the Suns get these much needed wins.

4. P.J. Tucker

Weekly Average: 5 points, 5 rebounds in 12.5 minutes of play; +1.5

Tucker's stats certainly don't seem very impressive upon first glance...and he also missed the Magic Game last Sunday along with Dragic. However, Tucker's defense was huge for the Suns in both of their wins. His game is full of intangibles that simply don't show up on the stat sheet...but his impact couldn't be more apparent.

5. Jermaine O'Neal

Weekly Average: 7 points, 3 rebounds, and 2 Blocks in 15 minutes of play; +5

O'Neal found a way to make a positive impact once again this week. Jermaine has become a very consistent player for the Suns off the bench. He gives the Suns additional size in the post and almost always plays excellent defense. This week was no exception, and the Suns probably wouldn't have been able to win these past two games without him.

6, Markieff Morris

Weekly Average: 9 points, 5 rebounds, 1 assist, 1 block in 26 minutes of play; +8

Markieff had a pretty solid week overall. He has bounced around--both in and out of the starting line-up as head coach Alvin Gentry continues to look for the right fit. However, he has taken each change in stride and continued to play through it. Morris provided the Suns with efficient play on both ends of the court this week and helped the team.

7. Shannon Brown

Weekly Average: 13 points, 3 rebounds, and 2 assists in 37 minutes of play; +3

Brown actually didn't have a great week, despite his misleading stats. Although he averaged 13 points per game, he shot only 13-40 from the field at 32%, and took his fair share of bad shots in the process. He is not a very good defender, and is also at fault for a lot of the stagnation that happens on offense when there is too much dribbling and not enough passing. However, Brown can also be an explosive game changer for the Suns when he is in his groove, and he did help give life to the struggling Suns offense at times...so he wasn't all bad.

8, Sebastian Telfair

Weekly Average: 5 points, 4 assists, and 1 steal in 21 minutes of play; +4

Bassy had an average week all things considered. He got his first start of the season against the Magic when Dragic was sick, and although he only scored 6 points on 1-7 shooting from the field, he did have 8 assists to help make up for it. However, Telfair is just a better player off the bench in limited minutes. He provides defense and energy to the second unit and he certainly did his part this week.

9. Michael Beasley

Weekly Average: 6 points, 2 rebounds, and 1 block in 15 minutes of play; -5

Beasley was still a negative for the Suns this week, but he did seem to play slightly better as a power forward off the bench than he did at the three. Beasley was still a liability on defense, but he did make some nice plays to help set up his teammates at times and also gave the Suns some quality minutes in the first quarter against the Jazz. Beasley didn't have a good week by any means, but I did notice small improvements overall.

10. Luis Scola

Weekly Average: 6 points, 3 rebounds, and 1 assist in 14 minutes of play; -9

Scola just didn't play well this week at all. He shot only 8-23 from the field for 35% and simply wasn't able to contribute much in the way of rebounding or defense either. Hopefully this is just a bump in the road for Scola, as he is usually a much better player than we saw this week.

So there you have it...Feel free to voice your opinion in the comments below!

Suns fans, it is time to take a long, deep breath. This advice is not recommended to avoid the smell of Phoenix’s record through 24 games. Take a deep breath and be patient. Now is not the time for...

[[ This is a content summary only. Visit my website for full links, other content, and more! ]]
158383024

After witnessing a talented player completely fall apart in front of their eyes, the Phoenix Suns and head coach Alvin Gentry have decided to try something different.

For the near future at least, Michael Beasley is now primarily a backup power forward while Jared Dudley slides to the starting small forward spot in his place.

"We are trying to create an advantage for him," Gentry said. "He is a hybrid 3/4. Him being a 4-man sometimes gives us a bit of an advantage in what he can do."

"Where ever we can get him as a mismatch," Jared Dudley said about the move. "Defensively you have to scrap a little more against guys that are bigger than you. The 'four' is more on top, where he has more freedom to drive where the 'three' is more cluttered where you have to beat your man and the big. With a big guarding him, it's just you and him."

The Suns came into the season with two talented-enough power forward candidates in veteran Luis Scola and second-year player Markieff Morris and a dearth of starting talent on the wings. Once Scola was claimed off amnesty waivers, there was "no room at the inn" for Michael Beasley down low.

So the Suns proclaimed Beasley the starter at SF and Jared Dudley the starter at SG. There. All the spots are filled in nicely. Smiley-face.

But despite showering love and patience on SuperCoolBeas, disaster struck. After years of being so-so on the court in terms of point differential when he's out there vs. when he's not (see below, it's TRUE), Beasley has suddenly become the worst player in the NBA. By a wide margin. The Suns are +6 per game when he sits, and MINUS 13.5 when he is on the floor. That's a net swing of almost 20 points. PER GAME.

Looks unbelievable right? When you consider that the Suns have dug double-digit deficits 19 of 24 games while recovering from nearly half of them and winning five with the second unit, the story becomes a little more believable.

So, Alvin had to do something. They invested too much money and effort in Beasley just to give up after 23 games.

Now he's going to sit Luis Scola and/or Markieff Morris in favor of Beasley at PF for a while to see if playing PF might work out. But he's also cutting Beasley's time, lessening his potential impact on any one game.

"Whatever the team needs, that's what I'm going to do," Michael Beasley said about the move, coupled with less playing time. "As far as what I think, honestly it doesn't matter. It's about what coach thinks. Whether it be the 3. Whether it be the 4. Coming off the bench. Whatever the team needs me to do, that's what I'll do."

"It's a work in progress," Goran Dragic said. "But I think it's going to be good. Beas can penetrate, he can make passes."

Then the Dragon touched on the biggest concern of Beasley playing the 4-spot. "But on defense everybody has to help each other."

In the last two games, Beasley was a +6 in 18 minutes against the Jazz (the rest of the team's minutes were +9), and a -3 against the Grizzlies in 10 minutes (the rest of the team's minutes were +5).

Less time. Better mismatches. Will it work?

The likelihood is a big huge YES. Frankly, it can't get worse. Beasley has never been this bad. In his prior four years, the worst you can say is that he was average to slightly below average, in terms of net team results.

The first four years

Pat Riley drafted Michael Beasley #2 overall after the Bulls had wavered on SuperCoolBeas before eventually settling on Derrick Rose.

Beasley was clearly a top-2 pick, with a big dropoff to the next tier. Director of Operations for the Memphis Grizzlies John Hollinger (then of ESPN) had Beasley rated as one of the best pro prospects ever. But Beasley already had some red flags and Riley tried hard to trade the pick before ultimately taking Beasley.

Despite being undersized at 6'8" (though many say he's 6'10"), Beasley has played most of his career at the Power Forward spot (see breakdown of years below). Head coaches Pat Riley and Rick Adelman saw that Beasley had a better chance to succeed against bigger, slower guys because Beasley lacked focus and lateral quickness to consistently stay with a wing player.

Kurt Rambis was the only head coach who saw otherwise. Rambis thought that since Beasley liked to shoot jumpers, then he should play a perimeter spot while bigger guys played closer to the basket. They had Al Jefferson and rookie Kevin Love down low. Nice theory, and Beasley actually was kind of effective there, but the team overall stunk and Beasley was clearly not the future.

Then he found a bleeding heart who saw the great potential inside Beasley and got an $18 million, 3-year contract ($15 million guaranteed) to make a fresh start in Phoenix. The first thing Blanks did was call Beasley a small forward, a position he'd only played for one year in the NBA.

When I asked Beasley in training camp if he preferred to be down low vs. on the perimeter, he said without hesitation that he'd rather be on the perimeter. In terms of physical matchups, Beasley profiles as a SF.

But this year so far has been a disaster.

According to 82games.com, Michael Beasley's net on/off points differential and overall effectiveness are:

2008-09:

Beasley played half his team's minutes that season, nearly every one of his seconds at the PF spot. He was offensively effective (PER 19.2) and defensively challenged (19.6 PER against). Scoring-wise, they were about even with him out there. He was perimeter-oriented despite playing PF, taking 70% of his shots outside 10 feet from the hoop.

2009-10:

Beasley again played half of the team's available PF minutes this season as the HEAT made the playoffs. With him on the court (alongside Wade and Jermaine O'Neal), the HEAT had a +2.6 in point differential and Beasley was more efficient than his opponent by a wide margin - an improvement over his rookie season.

But his team played even better with him on the bench (+5.9 points), resulting in a net-negative overall and a dump-off to Minnesota for a couple of future second-round picks to clear space for LeBron and Bosh. Beasley was involved in trade talks by Miami his entire two-year career.

2010-11:

A terrible Minnesota Timberwolves team that won only 17 games versus 65 losses was actually marginally better with Beasley on the court than off of it (Net: +2.2). Head coach Kurt Rambis had the genius idea to make Beasley a swing forward. He alternated Beasley between PF and SF (mostly SF), something Beasley had never done before. Rookie Kevin Love had a lot to do with that. 80% of Beasley's shots that year were jumpers as he moved further and further from the basket.

Breaking down his time between PF and SF, Beasley was significantly better at PF where he played 24% of the team's available PF minutes that season (net point diff: -1.0) vs. when he played SF for 33% of the available SF minutes (net point diff: -7.7).

2011-12:

New coach Rick Adelman made two major decisions as it pertained to Michael Beasley. First, Beasley was better at PF. Second, Kevin Love was a LOT better than Beasley at PF.

So they moved Beasley into the background. He went from starter to reserve, this time playing only a third of his team's available minutes. He played mostly behind Love at PF, taking 27% of the team's PF minutes with the rest of his time at SF. He was actually worse this season as a PF than at SF, though he played most of his minutes at PF.

The team wasn't too bad with him out there, but they were better when he sat the bench by about 2 points per game. His contract was not picked up, and the former #2 pick became a free agent.

158380915

The Suns have been a different team over these last two games...no doubt about it. Whether or not this is truly a change in identity and a sign of things to come remains to be seen. But one thing's for sure, winning sure feels better than losing!

Let's take a look at what some of the other popular websites and blogs had to say about the Phoenix Suns' win over the Utah Jazz last night:

Phoenix Suns cool off Utah Jazz, win second-straight game by Paul Coro of azcentral.com

The Suns had to match the physical way Utah plays to beat the Jazz. That meant controlling the Jazz’s offensive rebounds and points in the paint while keeping the Jazz off the free-throw line. The Suns were beaten in second-chance points by six, but Marcin Gortat out-rebounded Al Jefferson 14-12. The Suns outscored Utah by two at the free-throw line and by six for points in the paint. Playing Utah even at its game was a big boost, especially on a night when the Suns finally showed some shooting eye from long distance, going 6 for 13 and showing more prudence in taking them.

The Suns beat Utah at their own game by winning the battle of the bigs and scoring more points in the paint. Rather than the outside-in offensive approach the Suns had been using for most of the season, Phoenix was able to get the ball into the post through great ball movement, or kick it out to open shooters when the defense would collapse. Head coach Alvin Gentry called for more ball movement instead of over-dribbling the ball (looking at you Shannon Brown), and that's exactly what he got last night.

Suns slip past Jazz 99-84 by Johnathan Dalton (Associated Press) Yahoo Sports

The Suns had trailed by double digits in all but one of their prior 11 home games and in 19 of 23 overall, but that wasn't an issue against Utah.

After falling behind early, the Suns took a 20-18 lead on a reverse layup by Dudley with 4:26 left in the first quarter and never looked back.

Coming out fast and playing aggressive was certainly a key to winning this game. The Suns were able to carry over their momentum from the Grizzlies' win and get off to a hot start on both ends of the court. Rather than trying to make their patented fourth-quarter comeback, the Suns were able to play in front for nearly the entire game, allowing the players to play loose and more confidently.

Notebook: Suns 99, Jazz 84 by Mike Tulumello, for NBA.com

The Jazz (13-11) had their four-game win streak snapped. The Suns (9-15) got a huge game from Jared Dudley, who is playing as if he is the solution at the starting small forward spot. Dudley put up a season-high 22 points, plus five assists, four rebounds and three steals in 43 minutes.

Marcin Gortat added 12 points and 14 boards while defending Al Jefferson, who usually crushes the Suns. In this game, Jefferson settled for 14 points and 11 rebounds.

Goran Dragic had 17 points, five assists and just one turnover.

Jared Dudley was certainly the player of the game for the Suns--once again doing it all as he played 43 minutes and wouldn't allow Gentry to let him leave the floor until garbage time at the end of the game. However, the play of P.J. Tucker and Jermaine O'Neal, especially in the fourth quarter, should also be mentioned as they both played huge for the Suns in crunch time to keep the Jazz at bay.

NBA Regular Season: Final Score Utah Jazz 84, Phoenix Suns 99 by AllThatAmar SLC Dunk

It was all pretty much started by Goran Dragic though. Dribble penetration. It's a problem. PS. Turn overs suck -- and so does losing to a Michael Beasley team.

Of course we need to provide the viewpoint from the competition's eyes as well. The recap from the boys over at SLC Dunk was pretty much the same though...but you have to laugh at that last little quip about losing to a Michael Beasley team. Oh B-Easy...how your reputation precedes you!

And finally...while it's not a recap. There was one quote from an opposing player that caught my eye which I felt the need to highlight here:

"I don't think their defense is that great to be honest with you." We just didn't execute as well as we're supposed to."
-- Paul Millsap

Hmmm...I suppose that's possible Mr. Millsap. However, this performance didn't just come out of nowhere either. The Suns played the same exact way against the Grizzlies on Wednesday night to hand them their fifth loss of the season. I think the Suns deserve a little credit here, don't you?

20121212_mjr_su5_031

Like the awful movie starring Eddie Murphy, the Phoenix Suns have only been able to offer up mediocrity at best, and gut-wrenching displays at worst, on the defensive end of the floor this season. Recent grumblings hit new heights, as calls for firings, benchings and even tomato-ings. A seven-game skid hit rock bottom in a loss to a very poor Orlando team by nine points. All hope was lost and blame needed to be assigned.

Yours truly even wrote that the Suns flat out suck, after an arduous analysis of every possession played over the skid. Check out that article for some interesting insight as to why I came to that conclusion.

Then something interesting happened – we won. And against a team we lost to during the streak no less. AND against a team that has not only a winning record, but is one of the top teams in the league this season.

Hope restored.

Following that big win, everyone proclaimed that heads could remain firmly intact. It was surmised that changes were made that clearly worked, and that our performance was better than adequate. All of a sudden, our defense was not horrible, but decent. Our lineup and rotation issues have been solved. We can now all rest easy knowing that we no longer will drop to the bottom of the cellar, nor rise to the level of a playoff team and that our draft pick will once again be a middling one [wait, nobody wants that].

Not so fast!

Careful analysis of both games show some very interesting things, and lead me to believe that while some areas were improved over the first game, the Suns were helped considerably by Memphis in Game 2.

Keep in mind, the first game went to overtime and was back and forth throughout. That in and of itself was a good thing, considering a 40-point shellacking against a 7-17 Detroit Pistons a week prior.

In Game 1 against Memphis, we actually competed, and against a very good and balanced team. Memphis, might I remind you, has two quality bigs [one who is probably the best low post scorer in the game] a quality athletic point guard and an all-star wing that can clearly score on anyone [wouldn’t you love to have Gay].

Obviously, one conclusion I have drawn from this small sampling of games against Memphis is that by some weird doing, we actually match up well enough to cause Memphis problems. How else can you explain why both games were within one possession of going either way?

So for fans, the fact is, we played well against them the first time, despite the loss. In fact, if you look at that streak of losses, then Suns played fairly close to NY, Dallas and Orlando. Were it not for some stretches of the game where we mentally checked out, some or all of those could have gone the other way, and rather than an 8-15 record, we might be 15-8 and talking playoff seeding [and laughing even harder at LA]. Keep in mind, we have lost eight games by 5 or less points or in OT.

So instead of getting all "verklempt", maybe we should "simmer dahn nah" and keep some perspective.

Back to the game, since I did spend over 16 hours compiling all of this data…

First, let me give you a brief review of some findings from the first game, then I will go over what changed to the second. Remember, that I was focused solely on the defensive end, so everything I am talking about is Suns defensive possessions [or Memphis offensive possessions]. That is not to say I looked at things in a vacuum – I accounted for situations where our offense might have affected the defense or vice versa.

Note: This was written pre-Jazz game…

A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY:

As some of you are more detailed oriented [and others more skeptical] I feel it is necessary to provide some level of detail regarding how I ultimately came to some of the conclusions expressed herein. Therefore, to spare you time on the front end with all of this boring detail, I will place such information at the end of the article for your reference. I have not included my excel spreadsheet. If you would like to see that, write me a big fat check.

GAME 1 NOTES:

Here is the period-by-period average of our overall defensive rating for Game 1 as described in the methodology at the end of the article. Remember, I rated every defensive possession from 1 [worst] to 5 [best], so 3 should be average, or decent enough.

Gm1_rtg_medium

As you can see, our best performance defensively, in terms of how we actually played [but not the resulting outcome] was during the second period [27-27 actual score] despite the fact that the first quarter [25-18] actually turned out better for us on the scoreboard.

Keep in mind the fact that when you are dealing with human beings, you cannot predict any given outcome for a small sample size. What I mean is, PJ Tucker played incredible defense on Rudy Gay, yet Gay still scored, and conversely I saw Gortat play horrible defense on Gasol, only to see Gasol fumble the ball out [no credit to Gortat] and end the possession with a turn over. Great defense doesn’t always result in great results, and vice versa.

Another interesting thing to point out here is the evidence that we start games and the second half poorly, and this is possibly due to our lack of defense – it certainly shows in the numbers.

Maybe we should be focusing on that with regards to our lineups, rather than how well the offense is clicking.

The numbers here show suggest the reason we lost this game was not adequately defending in OT. One might think that the fourth quarter, where we gave up a four point lead, was the cause, but we actually played better defensively in that quarter. I am suggesting that Memphis simply executed better offensively against our improved defense in that situation.

Remarkably enough, during the third quarter, the Suns blew seven possessions with turnovers, which attributed to some of the decline in defensive performance [as their transition defense clearly was bad]. However, despite all of those turnovers, there wasn’t a significant change in actual score, as we still held a four point lead going into the fourth quarter [as opposed to a seven point lead].

So now let’s quickly look at Game 1 and how all of the possession’s played out:

Game_1_medium

As you can see from the chart above, Memphis’ offense was fairly evenly distributed among types of plays to initiate their outcomes. One thing to note was that the combination of PNR, ISO and PEN showed that Memphis got in the lane regularly and attacked the rim aggressively [keep that in mind].

The Grizzlies were adept at converting Post and Isolation plays, with those plays resulting in a score more than 60% of the time. You will also notice that the Suns defense against those plays was not stellar, falling significantly below average [3.0 is average] with 2.55 and 2.37 respectively.

The Suns were able to get closer to adequate on guarding dribble penetration [2.90 rating], which might surprise those who claim our guards get scorched by quicker more talented guards. Conley is very quick and Gay can do what he wants on the floor, but this shows we did a decent job [or just below decent].

Additionally, the concept that our big players might be the issue rather than the guards, is evidenced by the 2.71 rating on our pick and roll defense [versus the better rating on dribble penetration, showing that the guards are doing a slightly better job guarding their man when they are not being picked off].

Getting more detailed on the PNR, I decided to test my earlier assumptions that the Suns are far better off hedging or trapping hard on every pick and roll. Obviously as a coach, I intuitively believe this as a general rule [and not in exclusion of making adjustments for certain teams/players that are extra capable of beating those traps], but I wanted to see if the results match.

Well, as they say in Mythbusters – CONFIRMED!

Of the 21 PNR plays, the Suns hedged/trapped hard on 9 plays [and sagged on 12]. When they did, Memphis converted a score on only 3 of those plays [33% conversion] and allowed a total of 8 points.

Conversely when they sagged, Memphis was able to convert a significantly greater amount of possessions [7 or 58%] and allowed a total of 14 points. On a point per possession comparison, you are talking a difference between 0.89 on hedges and 1.17 on sags, a tremendous difference. Even more alarming, the rating of how well we performed defensively between the two was night and day.

Our rating on hedge possessions was a whopping 4.11, which is close to dominant, while our sag defense rated a paltry and pathetic 1.58. Why would we ever use sagging as a strategy based on those numbers? We clearly are not good at playing that way, and the results from hedging show we are both great, and successful at producing positive outcomes.

Finally, another observation I had is that our offense must not be that bad. We stayed in the game with a top team all while playing below average defense. Our offense had to have taken up the slack to be able to get it tied in regulation. In fact, the Suns led most of the game [other than in the beginning]. All of this talk about scoring, the need for a go-to player, touches, etc., and it occurs to me that it really might just be the defensive end that needs work.

THE DIFFERENCE IN GAME 2

Gm_2_rtg_medium

The first thing you might notice from the chart above is that our overall defense improved from what I call below average to just about average. While you might not get overly excited about, it is the detail you can smile over.

First, while we continued to start the game without much defensive prowess, we seemed to correct our third quarter lull by posting a hearty 3.4 rating in Game 2’s third quarter. That clearly is above average, and while not great, is good. You will also notice that our entire second half was solid. But surprisingly enough, we still only managed to stay close with Memphis and eek one out.

Game_2_medium

Looking at the breakdown of possessions yields a treasure trove of interesting tidbits. First is the incredible disparity amongst possession types. As opposed to Game 1, Memphis utilized the PNR almost twice as much, and at the expense of evenly distributing how the instigated their opportunities. If you remember, in Game 1 they attacked the rim aggressively through PNR, ISO and PEN. I say attacked because Memphis was able to get in the lane on PNR by both our sagging defense [allowing them into the lane] and their aggressiveness in trying to get there. Conversely, in Game 2, they seemed to lack aggression going to the rim, choosing not to penetrate or ISO as much.

The other area that I found intriguing was the fact that Memphis only had seven, SEVEN post plays in Game 2 [Game 1 they had 20 – and converted 60% of them]. You might say our dramatic improvement in our defense [3.57 rating in game 2 from a Game 1 rating of 2.55 – nice!] contributed to their choice to ignore throwing it to the block, yet they still converted about the same percentage of post plays they ran. This is why I believe that despite our improvements on the defensive end, Memphis did us a favor by going away from their clear advantage over us.

The fact is, that when you look at the conversion rate for PNR, POST, PEN and ISO, there isn’t a significant change. This means they are good at, and we are not good at, those types of plays, no matter how much better or worse our defense might have been from game to game. This shows you that matchups in this league are very meaningful. Something about the Suns and how we are constructed gives Memphis a difficult time on the PNR. In Game 2, they mistakenly went to that as their bread and butter, when they should have focused on throwing into the post and isolating Rudy Gay.

In Game 2 you should notice a trend – that we are not good in transition defense.

In both games we were pretty awful, and that isn’t because we get scored on. We are awful because too many times, Memphis pushed past us for no real reason other than our laziness or arguing with the refs. While that happens with a lot of teams at times, we consistently played the break poorly, making classic errors like not stopping the ball or simply losing someone behind us.

It doesn’t help that turnovers and bad browns, I mean shots, contribute to a disadvantage in transition. Yet the ratings aren’t low because we didn’t have numbers, but for the reasons above. It is expected that we will give up fouls or points on the break. What is not expected is the number of times you groan watching them out hustle us. The Suns need to fix this, because there is no excuse for it.

Another tidbit is this idea that our newfound zone defense. It turns out, at least against Memphis, that our defensive rating of 3.11 was solid in comparison to anything we did in Game 1. The fact that Memphis only converted 22% of possessions when we went zone, and scored only 4 points on 9 possessions, showed that Memphis has a significant issue [if this small sample actually represents how they play against the zone].

I think I might throw some more zone the next time we play them and see if that holds. Certainly, this lends credence to my theory that Memphis was not attacking like they were in Game 1, as they settled for a lot of perimeter play in Game 2 – helping the Suns.

Finally, after my scathing diatribe about how the Suns need to improve their pick and roll defense, let’s look at whether they were listening to me (because we all know they were).

What is interesting here is that despite a significant increase in the number of PNR possessions, Memphis still managed to convert slightly more of them in Game 2. One might conclude then that their PNR defense did not improve. I would contend that Memphis actually improved their execution of the PNR in Game 2 rather than stating that the Suns did not improve their defense. The evidence shows this.

First, the Suns hedged on a significantly greater proportion of possessions [51% in Game 2 to 43% in Game 1]. In fact, the grizzlies converted FEWER possessions when hedged than the first game. Again, it is abundantly clear that hedging/rotating is key. Despite more than double the amount of hedged possessions, the Suns managed to hold Memphis to only 2 more points off those plays [Game 1 PPP 0.89 to game 2 ppp 0.53]. If the Suns could manage to hold teams to even 0.75 ppp, they would be the single greatest defensive team in the history of mankind [don’t hold me to that factpinion].

The real reason the Suns were able to play better defense [rating increase] yet still not decrease the Grizzlies conversion rate were the possessions they sagged on the PNR. The suns gave up double the points, despite an increase in sag possessions of only 50%. In other words, they allowed 78% of saggy possessions to score in Game 2 versus 58% in game 1.

Clearly, I am not going to get off my soapbox about this hedging thing.

The disparity between how well we defend [in ratings and in results] is so wide, you have to be bit nuts not to take note. While some would argue the “well, it depends on the players you are guarding” chestnut, I believe that would only matter in a situation where the rating and result disparity were closer and there was more risk involved with making that type of strategy choice. When the numbers are so lopsided, you are really able to risk the occasional bad play or “beat” here and there knowing that on the whole, the odds are overwhelming in your favor to do it.

One final anticlimactic and completely obvious observation [from looking at all of these possessions]: Jared Dudley is a freakin’ stud. He made so many plays in the 4th quarter in Game 2 that I curse any of you expressing your willingness to trade him. Celo said it best – “forget you”.

____________________________________________

METHODOLOGY:

The first thing you have to understand is that I do not have access to Synergy Sports Tech, or any sort of wonderful technology that allows me to index video automatically and dump that data into any database. I also am not sure that what that wonderful technology does actually can replace what a person, who is knowledgeable in regards to the game, can do. In fact, as I did this, I realize how subjective any action on the court can be interpreted, and that someone with less than stellar experience could be swayed to view certain actions in a way that does not actually fit with a fundamental laws of basketball. Yet I digress. Bottom line is that I watch games much differently than someone who simply enjoys basketball or plays it. It is in my nature.

Using my DVR, I reviewed the game - every second of it. In fact, I rewound and re-watched every play a couple of times to make sure I didn't miss anything. Prior to viewing, I put a lot of though about the plethora and variety of items I would find during a possession and created a chart to fill out. Obviously, if I had infinite amount of time and money, I could have broken out many more things, such as how long any individual guarded another or the ball, who was on the floor and when, and every single minute detail. Rather than do that, may main focus was to capture the main essence of the defensive play.

For example, while a pick and roll [PNR] might have been employed on a possession, unless that PNR was the instigator or initiator of the coming result [score or change in possession], it was not as relevant to the cause of the end result of the possession. So if Memphis ran a PNR that was poorly executed, or even guarded well, but then decided change course and throw the ball to the post and isolate Randolph for 8 seconds of the shot clock for a score, the main offense used to initiate that score really was a post play, and the PNR was not factored very much into the play [although if they played it really tough, I did note that and would factor that partially into rating the overall possession a little higher].

For each defensive possession, I notated the type of play used to initiate the main action. I also notated the main defensive players involved, what they did, both right and wrong, as well as my “opinion” with regards to how the defense executed [my opinion was based on my hundreds of thousands of possessions I have coached over the years – and my ability to understand fundamentally why things occur on the floor]. Additionally I noted the results of the play, including special note of how the PNR was played, whether we hedged/trapped or sagged.

I tried to account for all situations within my notes – such as times when great D only resulted in a lucky score, or conversely bad defense ended with a steal or a miss, and everything in between. I then rated those actions on a scale of 1-5, with 1 being terrible defense and 5 being great defense. Any great defense that still resulted in a score got a 4 rating. Any stop with terrible defense usually earned a 2 rating [except for possessions, for example, where we clearly played extremely bad defense only to have Memphis throw the ball stupidly out of bound, but not of our doing – those got a 1 rating].

I then took all of those notes, entered them into Excel and created sortable tables. Once I had all of the data in the tables, I was able to organize them and create some analysis which you see above. Essentially I recorded how many defensive possessions, exactly what plays were used and the results, and rated every possession. Then I worked some math and was able to come up with some metrics to use for comparison among both games played against Memphis.

For the charts, here are what the headers mean if you need further explanation:

TYPE = action that initiated the result on the possession

PNR = Pick and Roll

POST = Post play

ISO = Isolation or a play in which the player created on their own [not in the post]

PEN = Any penetrating move not using a PNR, but off of some sort of team movement or set [not isolation]

SW = possessions where no clear play was used, no picks or curls, just perimeter ball movement to open player

CURL = Really any play from a curl or a set of picks off the ball

FB = Fast Break offense

OTHER = Things like offensive rebounds, offense created from a turnover, or mad scrambles that don’t fit with any other category

# = number of times that occurred

% = Distribution of the offense – what percentage of the offense came from that type of action

PTS OFF = Point generated from that type of action

CONV = How many of those plays led to a score

CONV % = Rate of converting those plays for scores

DRTG = The average rating of those plays based on the rating system above

Page 758 of 1593

758

Sponsored Ads